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LEGALITY OF STRIKES IN CALIFORNIA PUBLIC
EDUCATION: A MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVE
J. Michael Taggart*
You must know, then, that there are two methods of fight-
ing, the one by law, the other by force: The first method
is that of men, the second of beasts; but as the first method
is often insufficient, one must have recourse to the second.
-Machiavelli
INTRODUCTION
Strikes by public employees in all aspects of public em-
ployment have increased significantly within the past ten
years. Even in those states that have specifically banned
strikes by public employees, strikes have continued to plaguie
public employers.' Even if public employees do not have the
legal right to strike, many feel that if they have the power to
strike they will exercise such power, relying on their collective
strength to force a settlement that will include a no-reprisal
provision insulating them from any disciplinary action. It is
interesting to note that those educational employees previously
covered under the Winton Act,2 and now governed by the new
California public education collective bargaining law, the
Rodda Act,3 who have engaged in strike activity4 have not been
terminated from their employment, even though certain strike
leaders have been cited for contempt of court for refusal to obey
court ordered injunction.' This fact lends credence to the school
* B.A., 1966, University of Santa Clara; J.D., 1969, University of Santa Clara;
Member, State Bar of California.
1. PUBLIC SERVICE RESEARCH COUNCIL, PUBLIC SECTOR BARGAINING AND STRIKES
(1976) [hereinafter cited as PUBLIC SECTOR BARGAINING AND STRIKES]. In this study it
was noted that between 1958 and 1974 public employee strikes increased from 15 to
382.
2. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 13080-13089 (West 1975) (repealed 1975).
3. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 3540-3549 (West Supp. 1978).
4. From July 1, 1976 to March 1, 1978 there have been 26 public school strikes
in California.
5. See San Diego Unified School Dist. v. San Diego Teachers Ass'n, S.D. 399394
(Cal. Super. Ct., Aug. 16, 1977), wherein Hugh Boyle, President of the San Diego
Teachers Association was fined $4000.00 and sentenced to ten days in jail for his
participation in a four-day teachers strike in San Diego. The San Diego Teachers
Association was also fined $4,500.00. The Court of Appeal for the Fourth District
denied a writ of certiorari to review the contempt judgments, but the California Su-
preme Court granted a hearing in this matter. San Diego Teacher's Ass'n v. Superior
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of thought that legislating against public employee strikes will
not necessarily end strikes.'
LEGALITY OF PUBLIC STRIKES IN CALIFORNIA
Common Law
It is a well-established common law principle that no pub-
lic or private employee has a legal right to strike.' It was not
until the enactment of the National Labor Relations Act' that
private employees were given the right to engage in concerted
activities, including lawful strikes.
In United Federation of Postal Clerks v. Blount,' the
United States District Court upheld the constitutionality of
federal law prohibiting federal or District of Columbia employ-
ees from participating in strikes.10 The court rejected argu-
ments that such a statute violated federal governmental em-
ployees' due process rights, equal protection rights or freedom
of association rights, noting that:
Given the fact that there is no constitutional right to
strike, it is not irrational or arbitrary for the Government
to condition employment on a promise not to withhold
labor collectively, and to prohibit strikes by those in public
employment, whether because of the prerogatives of the
sovereign, some sense of higher obligation associated with
public service, to assure the continuing function of the
Government without interruption, to protect public health
and safety or for other reasons. Although plaintiff argues
that the provisions in question are unconstitutionally
Court, 4 Civ. No. 16794 (Cal. Sup. Ct., June 29, 1978). See also Almond v. County of
Sacramento, 276 Cal. App. 2d 32, 80 Cal. Rptr. 518 (1969), where the California court
of appeal upheld the firing of 127 county enlployees who engaged in an unlawful strike
and thus were considered to be absent without leave. In Hortonville Joint School Dist.
v. Hortonville Educ. Ass'n, 426 U.S. 482 (1976), the United States Supreme Court
upheld the authority of a school board to investigate and terminate striking teachers
6. See Bernstein, Alternatives to the Strike in Public Labor Relations, 85 HARv.
L. REV. 459, 462-63 (1971), where the author argues that it may be counterproductive
to legislate harsh penalties for public employee strikes. However, it is safe to say that
if strikes are legalized, strike activity will increase. See PUBLIC SECTOR BARGAINING AND
STRIKES, supra note 1.
7. United Fed'n of Postal Clerks v. Blount, 325 F. Supp. 879 (D.D.C. 1971), aff'd
without opinion, 404 U.S. 82 (1971). In Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 306, 311 (1926),
Mr. Justice Brandeis stated: "Neither the common law nor the Fourteenth Amend-
ment confers the absolute right to strike."
8. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at
29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1970 & Supp. 1975)).
9. 325 F. Supp. 879 (D.D.C. 1971), aff'd without opinion 404 U.S. 82 (1971).
10. 5 U.S.C. § 7311(3) (1976).
[Vol. 18
1978] LEGALITY OF STRIKES
broad in covering all Governmental employees regardless
of the type or performance of the work they perform, we
hold that it makes no difference whether the jobs per-
formed by certain public employees are regarded as
'essential' or 'non-essential' or whether similar jobs are
performed by workers in private industry who do have the
right to strike protected by statute."
In California the common law concept that, absent specific
legislation, public employees do not have the right to strike has
been followed in numerous decisions, including the California
Supreme Court decision of Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit
Authority v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen," which found
that the Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority Act of
1957 gave transit employees covered under the Act the specific
right to strike and absent this specific grant such a right would
not have existed.
California Statutory Law
Under the Rodda Act, and formerly under the Winton Act,
the California State Legislature has specifically provided that
Labor Code section 923's is not applicable to public school em-
ployees. 4 In Pasadena Unified School District v. Pasadena
11. 325 F. Supp. at 883.
12. 54 Cal. 2d 684, 687, 355 P.2d 905, 906, 8 Cal. Rptr. 1, 2 (1960). However, in
In re Berry, 68 Cal. 2d 137, 151, 436 P.2d 273, 283, 65 Cal. Rptr. 273, 283 (1968), the
California Supreme Court stated that it did not have to decide if public employee
strikes could be enjoined since the injunction in question was unconstitutional. See
also Pasadena Unified School Dist. v. Pasadena Fed'n of Teachers, 72 Cal. App. 3d
100, 105-10, 140 Cal. Rptr. 41, 44-47 (1977); City and County of San Francisco v.
Evankovich, 69 Cal. App. 3d 41, 47-48 n.5, 137 Cal. Rptr. 883, 886-87 n.5 (1977);
Crowley v. City and County of San Francisco, 64 Cal. App. 3d 450, 454-55, 134 Cal.
Rptr. 533, 535 (1976); Los Angeles Unified School Dist. v. United Teachers of Los
Angeles, 24 Cal. App. 3d 142, 145, 100 Cal. Rptr. 806, 808 (1972); Trustees of Cal. State
Colleges v. San Francisco State College Fed'n of Teachers, 13 Cal. App. 3d 863, 867,
92 Cal. Rptr. 134, 136 (1970); City of San Diego v. Am. Fed'n of State, County and
Mun. Employees Local 127, 8 Cal. App. 3d 308, 310-13, 87 Cal. Rptr. 258, 260-61
(1970); Almond v. County of Sacramento, 276 Cal. App. 2d 32, 34-35, 80 Cal. Rptr.
518 (1969); and.Newmarker v. Regents of Univ. of Calif., 160 Cal. App. 2d 640, 646,
325 P.2d 558, 562 (1958), where the California court of appeal ruled that a strike by a
public employee terminates the employment relationship with the public agency.
13. CAL. LAB. CODE § 923 (West 1971), which provides in part:
Therefore it is necessary that the individual workman have full freedom
of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of his
own choosing, to negotiate the terms and conditions of his employment,
and that he shall be free from the interference, restraint, or coercion of
employers of labor, or their agents, in the designation of such representa-
tives or in self-organization or in other concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.
14. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3549 (West Supp. 1978).
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Federation of Teachers," following Los Angeles Metropolitan
Transit Authority, the court of appeal, in a case involving a
school district suit against two unions for damages because of
an unlawful strike, ruled that Labor Code section 923 guaran-
tees individual workers the rights to engage in concerted activ-
ity, including the right to strike. However, since the then-
existing Education Code section 13088 expressly stated that
Labor Code section 923 did not apply to its provisions, the
court found that it was clearly the legislative intent to withhold
this right to strike from public school employees."
With the enactment of the Rodda Act, the State Legisla-
ture has seen fit to carry over the prohibition of Labor Code
section 923 as being applicable to public school employees." It
must be assumed that the Legislature was aware of the cases
of Almond v. County of Sacramento'" and Los Angeles Unified
School District v. United Teachers-Los Angeles, '5 among oth-
ers, and would not have added Government Code section 3549
if it had intended to give public school employees the right to
strike."0
Contentions raised by public employee organizations in
justifying their right to strike a public employer have included
arguments such as equal protection, freedom of speech, and
involuntary servitude. To date, the California Courts of Appeal
have not been receptive to these arguments.
Constitutional Arguments
Equal protection of the law. In City of San Diego v.
A.F.S. C.M.E., Local 127,1 the California Court of Appeal was
15. 72 Cal. App. 3d at 106 n.1, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 45 n.1.
16. See Almond v. County of Sacramento, 276 Cal. App. 2d 32, 36, 80 Cal. Rptr.
518, 522 (1969), where the court of appeal ruled that the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act,
CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 3500-3511 (West Supp. 1978), governing city and county employee
labor relations, expressly withheld from such employees the rights of CAL. LAB. CODE
§ 923 (West 1971). See also City and County of San Francisco v. Evankovich, 69 Cal.
App. 3d 41, 52-53, 137 Cal. Rptr. 883, 890 (1977).
17. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3549 (West 1978) provides in pertinent part: "The enact-
ment of this chapter shall not be construed as making the provisions of Section 923 of
the Labor Code applicable to public school employees and shall not be construed as
prohibiting a public school employer from making the final decision with regard to all
matters specified in Section 3543.2."
18. 276 Cal. App. 2d 32, 80 Cal. Rptr. 518 (1969).
19. 24 Cal. App. 3d 142, 100 Cal. Rptr. 806 (1972).
20. See City and County of San Francisco v. Evankovich, 69 Cal. App. 3d at 52-
53, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 880-91 (1977).
21. 8 Cal. App. 3d 308, 87 Cal. Rptr. 258 (1970). In Norwalk Teachers' Ass'n v.
Board of Educ., 138 Conn. 269, 271, 83 A.2d 482, 484 (1951), declaring no right to strike
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confronted with the union's argument that denying a gardner
on a public golf course the right to strike while affording a
gardner on a private course that right does not serve a legiti-
mate, compelling state interest. The court responded to this
contention by stating that:
The reasons for the law denying public employees the right
to strike while affording such right to private employees
are not premised on differences in types of jobs held by
these two classes of employees but upon differences in the
employment relationship to which they are parties. The
legitimate and compelling state interest accomplished and
promoted by the law denying public employees the right
to strike is not solely the need for a particular governmen-
tal service but the preservation of a system of government
in the ambit of public employment and the proscription of
practices not compatible with the public employer-
employee relationship ... .
The court added that the discrimination at which the equal
protection guarantee is aimed does not attach to the common
law prohibition against public employee strikes unauthorized
by statute merely because some statutes do grant public transit
district employees the right to strike. 3
Freedom of Speech
Whenever employee organizations engage in concerted
labor activities which involve the inducement of an unlawful
strike by public employees, the California courts have rules
that such speech "is subject to restraint if either the purpose
or the means used to exert such economic pressure is unlaw-
by publicemployees, the court quoted Franklin D. Roosevelt:
Particularly, I want to emphasize my conviction that militant tactics
have no place in the functions of any organization of Government employ-
ees .... [A] strike of public employees manifests nothing less than an
intent on their part to prevent or obstruct the operations of Government
until their demands are satisfied. Such action, looking toward the para-
lysis of Government by those who have sworn to support it, is unthinkable
and intolerable.
22. 8 Cal. App. 3d at 315-16, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 263-64. All the courts that have
ruled that public employee strikes are illegal have usually examined the distinction
between private sector employment and public sector employment and pointed out
that public employees gain certain rights and give up certain rights as a result of public
employment. Id. at 311-12, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 260-61. See also Shaw & Clark, The
Practical Differences Between Public Private Sector Collective Bargaining, 19
U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 867 (1972).
23. 8 Cal. App. 3d at 316, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 264.
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ful."' Mere advocacy of the right to strike is protected by the
first amendment but actual inducement of work stoppage is
illegal absent statutory authorization. 5
The California Supreme Court in In re Blaney"6 has ruled
that free speech guarantees in labor disputes are not subject to
the clear and present danger test since such speech is subject
to modification or qualification in the interest of the society in
which it exists. In labor relations the purpose of the economic
pressure and the means used to exert it must be lawful in order
for such speech to be protected. In City of Los Angeles v. Los
Angeles Building and Construction Trades Council" the court
of appeal upheld the constitutionality of a prior restraint upon
peaceful picketing in support of an unlawful public employee
strike. As the United States Supreme Court ruled in Thornhill
v. Alabama:
It is true that the rights of employers and employees to
conduct their economic affairs and to compete with others
for a share in the products of industry are subject to modi-
fication or qualification in the interest of the society in
which they exist. This is but an instance of the power of
the State to set the limits of permissible contest open to
the industrial combatants."8
Involuntary servitude. The argument that the use of in-
junctive relief to enjoin a strike by public employees would be
violative of the thirteenth amendment of the United States
Constitution is given short shrift by the courts. In Trustees
,of California State Colleges v. San Francisco State Federation
of Teachers9 the court of appeal ruled that since a public
employee has the right to resign his/her position at any time,
said individuals cannot be compelled by a court injunction to
labor against their will.
24. Pasadena Unified School Dist. v. Pasadena Fed'n of Teachers, 72 Cal. App.
3d 104, 108, 140 Cal. Rptr. 41, 45 (1977). See also In re Berry, 68 Cal. 2d 137, 436 P.2d
273, 65 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1968).
25. Pasadena Unified School Dist. v. Pasadena Fed'n of Teachers, 72 Cal. App.
3d 104, 110, 140 Cal. Rptr. 41, 46 (1977).
26. 30 Cal. 2d 643, 648, 184 P.2d 892, 896 (1947).
27. 94 Cal. App. 2d 36, 40-43, 210 P.2d 305, 308-10 (1949). See also Pasadena
Unified School Dist. v. Pasadena Fed'n of Teachers, 72 Cal. App. 3d at 109, 140 Cal.
Rptr. at 46-47 (1971); City and County of San Francisco v. Evankovich, 69 Cal. App.
3d at 49, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 887 (1977).
28. 310 U.S. 88, 103 (1940).
29. 13 Cal. App. 3d 863, 866, 92 Cal. Rptr. 134, 136-37 (1970).
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Injunctive Relief
Once it was established that strikes by public employees
in California are unlawful, most of the recent litigation has
centered around the constitutionality of the injunctive relief
fashioned by the courts. In the leading case of In re Berry,30 the
California Supreme Court overturned a contempt citation in-
volving county employees who were engaged in a strike against
the county on the grounds that the injunctive relief fashioned
by a superior court was overly broad and unlawfully restrained
informational picketing and speech not carried on for an un-
lawful purpose. The court ruled that the following portions of
the restraining order 3' were overly broad and constitutionally
improper:
1. Prohibition of all picketing and demonstrations in
front of county buildings: Ar to this portion the court ruled
that this prohibition would prohibit "mere informational
picketing and demonstrations designed to communicate
the content of grievances and mobilize public support. It
is clear that such informational picketing and demonstra-
tion, far from promoting or advocating a strike, might be
utilized in the hope of eliminating by intellecutal persua-
30. 68 Cal. 2d 137, 436 P.2d 273, 65 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1968).
31. The superior court ordered:
That Defendants, and each of them, their officers, agents, servants,
employees, representatives and members, and all persons in active con-
cert or participation with them, or in concert among themselves, be re-
strained and enjoined from doing directly or indirectly, by any means,
methods or device whatsoever, any and all of the following things:
(a) From ordering or continuing or attempting to induce any em-
ployee of the Plaintiff to cease work for or not to work for the Plaintiff;
(b) Froni intimidating, threatening, molesting or coercing the
Plaintiff or Plaintiff's agents, employees, suppliers, contractors, guests or
invitees;
(c) From striking or engaging in a work stoppage or other similar
concerted activity against Plaintiff, or inducing or calling a strike, work
stoppage or other concerted activity against Plaintiff; and
(d) From picketing, and from placing, stationing or maintaining, or
causing any picket or pickets to be stationed or maintained, and from
causing, participating in or inducing others to participate in any demon-
stration or demonstrations on any grounds, or that portion of any public
or private street which adjoins any grounds, or any sidewalk which is
contiguous to any portion of any portion of any private or public street
which adjoins any grounds which are owned, possessed or controlled by
the Plaintiff and on which are situated any building, buildings or struc-
tures of any kind whatsoever which are occupied by Plaintiff and in which
employees of Plaintiff are assigned to work.
Id. at 141-142, 436 P.2d at 276-277, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 276-277.
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sion the need for more drastic action."" Thus the restrain-
ing order would have precluded such picketing even absent
a strike, and without a showing that a specific governmen-
tal interest would be harmed by such picketing, no injunc-
tive relief would be proper.
2. Prohibition against inducing county employees to
cease work or threatening county employees or other per-
sons not to do work for the county: As to this portion the
court ruled that this would preclude any action done for
purely innocent purposes and not connected in any way
with the strike.3
3. Prohibition against striking, picketing "or other
concerted activity": As to this portion the court ruled that
this could involve non-strike activity such as distribution
of information, circulating petitions, or publishing arti-
cles.34
In warning against an unlawful restraint of first amendment
rights the court stated: "it is clear that constitutionally permis-
sible restrictions upon the exercise of First Amendment rights
must be drawn with a narrow specificity calculated to prevent
repression of expressive activities as to which restriction is con-
stitutionally forbidden. '35
In City and County of San Francisco v. Evankovich, the
court of appeal upheld an injunction that enjoined only picket-
ing in support of an actual strike or the hindering or interfering
with work at the public facility. 3' The California courts have
rejected the approach that some states have taken to the effect
that injunctive relief will be granted only if there is a showing
of violence, irreparable injury, or breach of the peace. For ex-
ample, in School District v. Holland Education Association,37
the Michigan Supreme Court reversed a trial court's issuance
32. Id. at 152, 436 P.2d at 283, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 283.
33. Id. at 154-55, 436 P.2d at 285, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 285.
34. Id.
35. Id. (citations omitted).
36. 69 Cal. App. 3d 41, 46-47, 137 Cal. Rptr. 883, 886 (1977). The injunction
prohibited the unions from:
1. Striking or calling or inducing or giving notice of a strike against the
plaintiff, City and County of San Francisco;
2. Picketing said plaintiffs facilities, buildings, and properties in sup-
port, promotion, or advocacy of a strike against said plaintiff.
The court of appeal in Evankovich indicated that the language in the San Francisco
State teacher's strike was similar and that such language had been upheld in Trustees
of Calif. State Colleges v. San Francisco State College Fed'n of Teachers, 13 Cal. App.
3d 863, 866-67, 92 Cal. Rptr. 134, 136 (1970).
37. 380 Mich. 314, 157 N.W.2d 206 (1968).
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of a temporary injunction against striking school teachers on
the ground that there was no showing in the record that the
school district would suffer irreparable injury in any manner if
the injunctive relief were not granted. The school district could
show only that its schools would not be open or staffed by
teachers on the scheduled opening date. In California, a simple
showing that a strike is unlawful is sufficient to obtain injunc-
tive relief, even though peaceful means are used to carry out
the strike, since such conduct is improper if the object is unlaw-
ful. 38
LIABILITY OF UNIONS FOR UNLAWFUL STRIKE ACTIVITIES
In the landmark decision of Pasadena Unified School Dis-
trict v. Pasadena Federation of Teachers,39 a California court
of appeal ruled that a teacher union that openly advocated and
solicited members of a school district to go on strike is liable
for damages on the theory of tortious inducement of breach of
contract and on a theory of direct liability for harm resulting
from an unlawful act. The court found that the relationship
between a teacher and the school district is based upon a statu-
tory contract which includes state statutes, the rules and regu-
lations of a school board, and board resolutions. 0 The union
attempted to argue that a labor union was privileged to induce
a breach of contract or to interfere with the contractual rela-
tionship because it has the right to represent employees under
the law. The court rejected this argument, ruling that such a
privilege applies only when a union is engaging in lawful activ-
ity. 4
Since strikes by public employees in California are unlaw-
ful, both Imperial Ice Co. v. Rossier,2 in which the California
Supreme Court articulated a rule of privilege for lawful union
activity, and the Restatement of Torts section 775 are not ap-
plicable. Thus, when the union advocated the breach of con-
38. See City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 94
Cal. App. 2d 36, 210 P.2d 305 (1949). In Los Angeles Unified School Dist. v. United
Teachers of Los Angeles, 24 Cal. App. 3d 142, 100 Cal. Rptr. 806 (1972), a temporary
restraining order prohibiting a strike by public school teachers was granted on the
simple showing that the strike would result in a loss of state and federal funds to the
district.
39. 72 Cal. App. 3d 100, 140 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1977).
40. Id. at 112, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 48; see also Fry v. Board of Educ., 17 Cal. 2d
753, 760, 112 P.2d 229, 234 (1941).
41. Id. at 110-111, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 47-48.
42. 18 Cal. 2d 33, 112 P.2d 631 (1941).
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tract by engaging in a one-day unlawful strike, the union sub-
jected itself to liability for damages.
In addition, the appellate court ruled that, even absent a
contract, the union would still be liable for inducing and par-
ticipating in an unlawful act. 3 In Garmon v. San Diego Build-
ing Trades Council" the California Supreme Court, in a case
involving a suit for damages and injunctive relief as a result of
a strike under the National Labor Relations Act, ruled that
Civil Code section 1708 imposes upon everyone the "duty to
abstain from injuring the person or property of another, or
infringing upon any of his rights."' 5 If a strike is unlawful, then
there is a breach of this legal duty. "That breach constitutes
the commission of a tort, under the laws of this state, for which
an action in damages will lie."" The court then went on to state
that "it is further established in this state that by an unlawful
and unauthorized labor practice an employer who is damaged
thereby may recover damages in a tort action."' 7
In the Pasadena case, in noting that Garmon was reversed
by the United States Supreme Court, the appellate court ruled:
The reversal therefore has no effect upon the validity of our
Supreme Court's statement as a pronouncement of Cali-
fornia law applicable to employment not subject to Na-
tional Labor Relations Board jurisdiction. Defendants
have not claimed that plaintiff is involved in interstate
commerce and it is patent that it is not. The union cannot
avoid liability for this tort by claiming it did not itself
strike. The complaint alleges directly that it induced and
encouraged such unlawful labor practice. All those who aid
and abet in the commission of an intentional tort are
equally liable with the party directly committing it.m"
The action by the union in Pasadena clearly falls within
the ambit of the Restatement of Torts. A pertinent part of
section 876 of the Restatement of Torts reads:
43. 72 Cal. App. 3d at 112-13, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 48-49.
44. 49 Cal. 2d 595, 320 P.2d 473 (1958), rev'd, 359 U.S. 236 (1959), on the theory
that the National Labor Relations Board had exclusive jurisdiction with respect to
employers in interstate commerce. Other sections of Garmon not pertinent to this
discussion were overruled in Petri Cleaners, Inc. v. Automotive Employees, Laundry
Drivers and Helpers Local No. 88, 53 Cal. 2d 455, 475, 349 P.2d 76, 88, 2 Cal. Rptr.
470, 480 (1960).
45. 49 Cal. 2d at 606, 320 P.2d at 479.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. 72 Cal. App. 3d at 113, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 49.
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For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious con-
duct of another, a person is liable if he
(a) orders or induces such conduct, knowing of the
conditions under which the act is done or intending the
consequences which ensue, or
(b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a
breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encour-
agement to the other so to conduct himself, .... ,
Based upon a more compelling factual situation because
of the duration of the strike and more clearly definable dam-
ages, the El Rancho Unified School District in Pico Rivera,
California recently filed a lawsuit against the National Educa-
tion Association, the California Teachers Association, the El
Rancho Education Association, the California Federation of
Teachers, and the El Rancho Federation of Teachers for dam-
ages resulting from a 25 day strike in 1976.5 The district based
its lawsuit on the fact that the above-mentioned employee or-
ganizations and unions induced the employees of the district
to breach their contract.
In addition, the suit alleges that the associations and un-
ions engaged in clearly unlawful activity and attempted to
force the district to negotiate with the defendants, who were
not the exclusive representative, in clear violation of California
Government Code section 3543.3.1l In the lawsuit the district
claimed it suffered actual damages of $1,085,000 as the result
of nineteen days of instruction being denied to the students and
because the amount of time and money in administrative costs
necessary to keep the schools open during the strike. The dis-
trict is also seeking an additional $10,000,000 in punitive dam-
ages, based upon an intentional violation of the law.
UNFAIR PRACTICES AND STRIKE ACTIVITY
As stated above, the Rodda Act specifically excludes the
right to strike.5" However, if public school employees do strike,
is an employee organization guilty of an unfair practice? Gov-
ernment Code section 3543.6 specifies that union conduct
which is prohibited.5"
49. RESTATEMENT OF ToRTs § 876 (1939).
50. El Rancho Unified School Dist. v. National Educ. Ass'n, No. C213061 (Cal.
Super. Ct., demurrer denied Mar. 15, 1978).
51. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3543.3 (West Supp. 1978). This section provides that a
school district is obligated to negotiate only with the exclusive representative.
52. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3549 (West Supp. 1978).
53. It shall be unlawful for an employee organization to:
19781
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If a union strikes it is usually to put pressure on a district
to capitulate to the union's demands. An early study of strike
activity under the Rodda Act indicated that of twenty work
stoppages during the first full school year, in not one instance
was the full impasse procedure used." This omission could give
rise to an unfair practice charge on the ground that a union has
failed to implement the impasse procedure in good faith.5 An-
other argument could be sustained on the theory that by plac-
ing unlawful pressure on a district during negotiations, a union
is not negotiating in good faith."
At the time this article was written, the California Public
Employment Relations Board (PERB) had not had the oppor-
tunity to rule on an unfair practice charge involving unlawful
strike activity. However, in El Rancho Unified School District
v. El Rancho Federation of Teachers,5" PERB did rule that a
school district had standing to file an unfair practice charge
against two unions who allegedly threatened and coerced em-
ployees during an illegal work stoppage. The charge was based
in part upon the theory that the unions had interfered with
employees' rights guaranteed by the Rodda Act.
If PERB fails to find that an unlawful strike constitutes an
unfair practice, unions will use the impasse procedure only
when they feel it can be employed to put political pressure on
(a) Cause or attempt to cause a public school employer to violate
Section 3543.5.
(b) Impose or threaten to impose reprisals on employees, to dis-
criminate or threaten to discriminate against employees, or otherwise to
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees because of their exercise of
rights guaranteed by this chapter.
(c) Refuse or fail to meet and negotiate in good faith with a public
school employer of any of the employees of which it is the exclusive
representative.
(d) Refuse to participate in good faith in the impasse procedure set
forth in Article 9 (commencing with Section 3548).
CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3543.6 (West Supp. 1978).
54. Special Bulletin, Puauc EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS REPORTER (July 29, 1977).
See also Currier, A Case Study: 16 Public School Job Actions and the Use of Impasse
Procedures, CALIF. PUB. EMPLOYEE REL. (June, 1977).
55. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 542.6(d) (West Supp. 1978).
56. But see Board of Educ. v. Detroit Fed'n of Teachers Local 231, 55 Mich. App.
499, 223 N.W.2d 23 (1974), in which the Michigan Court of Appeals ruled that an
unlawful strike was not a per se refusal to bargain in good faith and upheld the
Michigan Public Employment Relations Commission's decision to dismiss the school
district's petition. See also Lamphere Schools v. Fed'n of Teachers, 67 Mich. App. 331,
240 N.W.2d 792 (1976), and Warren Educ. Ass'n v. Warren Consolidated Schools, 1976
M.E.R.C. Lab. Op. 974 (Mich. 1976).
57. EERB Decision No. 45 (Dec. 30, 1977), [1977-1978] 2 PuB. EMPL. REP. CAL.
(L.R.P.) 2024.
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a school board. Instead of the procedure being used to assist in
reaching peaceful settlements, it will be used for political rea-
sons only. If unions will not be cited by PERB for unfair prac-
tices for striking during negotiations, including impasse, more
strikes will likely occur in California, with the unions claiming
that PERB has not "prohibited" them from striking. Clearly,
this result would be contrary to the intent of the legislature."
CONCLUSION
It is clear that in public education in California there have
been no restraints placed upon unions for engaging in unlawful
strikes. Until school boards determine that it will be in their
long-range best interests to terminate striking employees or to
successfully sue the unions for engaging in unlawful strike ac-
tivity, it is most likely that the unions will continue with the
activity that has been so successful for them over the past five
years. Of course, some unions may feel that their cause is justi-
fied and will engage in such activity no matter what the cost.
In the long run, until the employer-employee relationship sta-
bilizes, such strike activities will probably continue in light of
the tight financial restraints imposed upon school districts by
court decisions such as Serrano v. Priest" and by property
taxpayers' rebellions against higher public expenditures, such
as the recent passage of Proposition 13 in California (property
tax relief initiative). Such financial restraints clash head-on
with collective bargaining demands. There is a general proposi-
tion that he who has the power will exercise that power if neces-
sary. Unless the strike power is restrained, the education of
children will continue to suffer due to unlawful activities, labor
relation stability will be in turmoil, and the lofty goals of the
Rodda Act will be thwarted."
58. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3540 (West Supp. 1978).
59. 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1193, 96 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1971), aff'd on rehearing
18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907
(1977). In Serrano the California Supreme Court ruled that the method of funding
public education in California was unconstitutional.
60. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3540 (West Supp. 1978) states in part: "It is the purpose
of this chapter to promote the improvement of personnel management and employer-
employee relations within the public school systems in the State of California .. .
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